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It reads like a secular fall-myth: the first men communicated through vocal 
exclamations, which only eventually were institutionalised into words meaning by 
convention within a system of signs. The purpose of these pre-verbal vocalic 
utterances was to exteriorise our passions: because of their communal nature, 
searching out an auditor, because, also, of the vocal-auditory means of 
transmission, and because, finally, language had not yet been extracted from the 
sensuous world but was rather the means through which we inhabited this world, 
the first languages ‘were sung and impassioned before they were single and 
methodical’.1 As language became methodical rather than melodic, imitating and 
mediating rather than giving immediate voice to sensuous life, melody became the 
preserve of music alone: first as song opposed to speech, but then exiting the voice 
entirely to become instrumental music. This shift from vocal to instrument music 
coincides with a second shift: from the primacy of melody to diatonic system. 
Music too, in this sense, becomes a language that means by convention. 
Rousseau’s story (which I recount only in its broadest brushstrokes) is one of 
progress, but one, also, of loss. Where our ancestors, articulating themselves in 
melody and rhythm, spoke in poetry, we, in the epoch of disenchanted, 
disembodied rationality, but also of a politics whose eloquence, equally 
                                                             
1 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Essai sur l’origine des langues, où il est parlé de la Mélodie, et de l’Imitation 
musicale (Paris: Aubier Montaigne, 1974), p. 96. 
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disenchanted, is simply a repertoire of topics designed to ornament the phrase ‘give 
us some money’ (p. 173), consider poetry as a rarefied kind of language. Indeed, we 
might extrapolate—when metre and rhyme themselves becomes markers of a 
‘poetic’ form of language, the sensuous dimension of poetry too is subsumed into 
the same structure of the sign-that-means-by-convention, just as happened when 
melodic interval came to be formalised in diatonic harmony. 
 To extrapolate thus is, perhaps, to push the point excessively; nevertheless, its 
polemic pervades much of the thinking that would hope to find in poetry 
something like a ‘condition of music’. In qualifying his now celebrated aphorism, 
Pater tells us that music is the only kind of art in which there is no distinction 
between form and content; insofar as all art is characterised by ‘the constant effort 
… to obliterate [this distinction]’, each medium ‘aspires constantly towards the 
condition of music’.2 Within Rousseau’s speculative history, this necessity of craft 
attains metaphysical import. And something similar subtends Pater’s own 
argument, if never wholly articulated as such. He continues:  
 
Art, then, is thus always striving to be independent of the mere intelligence, to 
become a matter of pure perception, to get rid of its responsibilities to its 
subject or material; the idea examples of poetry and painting being those in 
which the constituent elements of the composition are so welded together, that 
the material or subject no longer strikes the intellect only; nor the form, the eye 
or the ear only; but form and matter, in their union or identity, present one 
single effect to the ‘imaginative reason,’ that complex faculty for which every 
thought and feeling is twin-born with its sensible analogue or symbol (138).  
 
The dualism of analogue and symbol is already far fallen from Rousseau’s original 
sung speech, but for both we see that the unity of form and matter is not only a 
synthesis of different art media, but also of mind and body—and indeed, of the 
receptive organs themselves, which are no longer carved up as ‘the eye or the ear 
only’. When Pater speaks of an ‘Anders-streben’ between the arts, he also gestures 
towards a synæsthetics of the human body.  
But such synæsthetics is by no means a merging of the art forms; rather, they 
converge only insofar as they insist on the specificity of their medium. To remain, 
                                                             
2 Walter Pater, ‘The School of Giorgione’, in The Renaissance (London: Macmillan, 1922), p. 135. 
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for a moment, contemporary to Pater: if Wagner was aspiring to a Gesamtkunstwerk, 
this coincided with an exploration of chromaticism and the compositional 
structure of the Leitmotiv; if Whistler’s ‘Nocturnes’ took their inspiration from 
Chopin, they were nevertheless concerned with using colour to overwhelm linear 
representation. The musical compound phrase ‘tone colour’ is in Whistler 
transposed into painting, its metaphor displaced from the second to the first of its 
terms. Or, to situate this in the present day, I may refer you to the conversation 
between poets David Herd and Simon Smith, and improvisational musicians Sam 
Bailey and Jake Hues, about their collaborative piece Rote/Thru (both conversation 
and collaboration are available on the site), who discuss some of the guiding 
faultlines and difficulties that arise in the collaboration between the two art forms, 
both by exploring the ontological peculiarities of the two media, and the questions 
that collaboration poses for practitioners. And, as all the contributions to the 
current volume observe, the ‘music of poetry’ will be necessity be a linguistic 
‘music’—and the musicality of language cannot be conflated with the musicality of 
linguistic sound. 
We should also note that Pater’s ‘condition of music’, pointing to a rather 
universal desire to unite form and content, tells us very little about the art itself, 
not least because it leaves undefined what such form or content might look like, or 
how they may be united. This is made strikingly clear by Peter Dayan in his 
‘Different Music, Same Condition’ (pp. 9-26): two accounts of the musical 
‘condition’ of poetry, by Douglas Hofstadter and Jean-François Lyotard 
respectively, agree wholeheartedly on what this condition is, and draw from it 
wholly opposed and mutually incompatible conceptions of what poetry and music 
are and ought to be. We should also notice that music, as well as constituting a 
‘condition’ for poetry, is also a rival art medium. As Joseph Acquisto notes in his 
contribution, ‘On Artistic Form and the Spiritual’ (68-87), some of the most 
significant theorists and practitioners of modernist art (Acquisto discusses 
Mallarmé, Schönberg and Kandinsky) grasped the ‘spiritual’ vocation of art—its 
shared ‘condition’—through an exploration of the specificity of medium, and 
through developing techniques which were themselves radically medium-specific. 
The shared vocation was predicated on the minutiae of craft. 
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Indeed, the case of Mallarmé is particularly illuminating, given his own 
admiration of Wagner, his friendship with Debussy, and the number of his works 
set to music. His wish to return poetry to a common source in music might be 
taken as an echo of Rousseau’s—were it not that what he aspires to in music is 
precisely what Rousseau excoriates: ‘instrumentation’ rather than the melodic 
voice, and moreover, an instrumentation that lies not simply in the sensuous 
dimension of language, but in the ‘intellectual word’: 
 
[N]ous en sommes là, précisément, à rechercher, devant une brisure des grands 
rythmes littéraires … et leur éparpillement en frissons articulés proches de 
l’instrumentation, un art d’achever la transposition, au Livre, de la symphonie 
ou uniment de reprendre notre bien : car, ce n’est pas de sonorités élémentaires 
par les cuivres, les cordes, les bois, indéniablement mais de l’intellectuelle parole 
à son apogée que doit avec plénitude et évidence, résulter, en tant que 
l’ensemble des rapports existant dans tout, la Musique.3 
 
‘Rhythm’, ‘instrumentation’, and ‘symphony’ are constructed in poetry not by 
‘simple sounds’ but the ‘intellectual word brought to its apogee’; the resultant 
‘Music’ is not simply an art form, not structured sound, but has become a 
vocation, an ontological insight that only poetry, through its workings of language, 
can fulfil: ‘the whole of relations existing in everything’. T. S. Eliot too, in his ‘The 
Music of Poetry’, will see ‘music’ as first and foremost not sonority, not figure of 
spontaneity or the overcoming of semantic meaning, but rather as relation: 
 
[T]he music of a word is, so to speak, at a point of intersection: it arises from its 
relation first to the words immediately preceding and following it, and 
indefinitely to the rest of its contexts; and from another relation, that of its 
immediate meaning in that context to all the other meanings which it has had in 
other contexts, to its greater or less wealth of association.4  
                                                             
3 Stéphane Mallarmé, ‘Crise de vers’, in Œuvres complètes (eds. Henri Mondor and G. Jean-Aubry 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1945), p. 367. [We are at the stage of seeking out, faced with a fragment of great 
literary rhythms ... and their scattering in shivers that are articulated into an instrumentation, for a 
means to achieve the transposition, into the Book, of the symphony or rather to take back what is 
ours: for it is not elementary sonorities by brass, woodwind, strings, but undeniably the 
intellectual word at its apogee in which Music, as the ensemble of relations that exist in 
everything, must fully and openly result.] 
4 T. S. Eliot, ‘The Music of Poetry’, On Poetry and Poets (London: Faber, 1957), pp. 32-3. 
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For Rousseau, the unity of music and language in melodic speech was anterior to 
both the functioning of language as a network of signs and the development of 
music into diatonic harmony: it is radically non-relational. For Mallarmé and Eliot, 
music has come to stand for relation itself. This also means that the music of a 
word is not mere ‘sonority’. But what of such sounds? One possibility is to 
disregard them entirely as being so much surface jingling. When Celan praised 
Mandelstam, it was for his refusal to go in for ‘impressionistic affect-poetry woven 
together out of sound-colours’: keine Wortmusik.5 Here, ‘music’ takes on a 
derogatory sense: it signifies easy, superficial sentimentalism, instant gratification, 
just as does for Adorno ‘the “musical language” of Rilke or Swinburne, which 
imitates musical effects and which is alien to the origins of music’.6 ‘Musical 
language’, on such an account, mere ‘effect’, is index of æsthetic decadence, 
grounded on a false model of music and language alike. By contrast, Kafka’s 
parables, which point towards a meaning but then break off leaving any 
determinate meaning unfulfilled—here literature has internalised the mode of 
cognition that, so argues Adorno, is characteristic of music itself. Whatever ‘music’ 
poetry has will inhere within its language, rather than simply be a kind of ‘surface 
effect’. Only by becoming deeply unlike music will the language of poetry touch on 
the origins of music. 
Yet just as syntax works Mallarmé’s Poésies, so is rhyme crucial to their peculiar 
condensation. In ‘Distraction Fits’ (pp. 27-67), Anne Stillman will cite Mallarmé’s 
‘Petit air II’, whose first two stanzas’ suspension of the grammatical subject is 
punctuated by the rich rhymes, which attain further density from Mallarmé’s use of 
the octosyllablic line: 
 
Indomptablement a dû 
  Comme mon espoir s’y lance 
  Éclater là-haut perdu 
  Avec furie et silence,  
 
                                                             
5 Paul Celan, ‘Die Dichtung Ossip Mandelstamms’, Tübigen Celan-Ausgabe vol. 5, p. 215. 
6 T. W. Adorno, ‘Music, Language, and Composition’, Essays on Music trans. Susan Gillespie, pp. 
113-126, p. 115. 
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  Voix étrangère au bosquet 
  Ou par nul écho suivie, 
  L’oiseau qu’on n’ouït jamais 
  Une autre fois en la vie.7 
 
The rhyme here, quite simply, cannot be dismissed as mere ‘sound-colour’, or 
taken to as mere play of ‘affect’; rather, it is a vehicle for the cognitive workings of 
the poem—and in the rime riche of s’y lance and silence, advertises itself as such. 
Rhyme, after all, is no less ineliminable a feature of our language than is syntax—
no matter how deaf to it we might become. 
Stillman sees ‘distraction’ as central to the cognitive processes of poems, in first-
hand accounts of composition, in the poems’ own linguistic operations, and in our 
experience of them. At first ‘music’ is approached as a figure within poems: a 
figure of danger, as ‘sense might drown in a whirlpool of sonority’ (p. 32), of the 
transience of aesthetic experience, and the poem’s hold over us, which at once 
diverts us and leads us to distraction. As for Mallarmé and Eliot, music for 
Stillman becomes the analogy of relation, of coherence. Poems hold together not 
as arguments do, but rather motivically, as an intricate weave of ‘many small 
details, many distracting movements’ (p. 63). This might offer a powerful 
corrective to Adorno’s highhanded dismissal of Swinburne and Rilke. Yes, poetry 
is musical when its cognition resists any precipitate filling out of concepts; but, pace 
Adorno, such resistance is generated by the poems’ prosodic texture, by the way 
they engage the ear, provoke and then drift away from our attentiveness, rather 
than simply a ‘structure’ lying behind its sensuous effects.  
If, then, linguistic music must also take into account the music of linguistic 
sound, then might musicological analysis allow insights into how we normally 
conceive of versification? This journal’s overriding opinion on the matter is made 
clear on the website’s homepage, and its reproduction of an image from Joshua 
Steele’s Prosodia Rationalis: an attempt to use the musical notation available in the 
                                                             
7 Stéphane Mallarmé, ‘Poésies’, Œuvres complètes, p. 66.  ‘Little Tune II’: ‘Indomitably must / like 
my far-flung hopes / have gone up with a bang, lost / in fury and silence, /voice stranger to the 
wood / or followed by no echo, / the bird you get to hear / only once. / The haggard musician, / 
expiring in doubt / that my breast and not his / might have issued the louder sob / blown apart 
will all of him / still hit the road!’ Peter Manson’s translation, The Poems in Verse, p. 155.  
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late eighteenth century to scan the prosody of English poetry. Yet much has 
happened in poetry and music since 1781: might recent work in musicology offer a 
more capacious understanding of the ‘music’ of words? This is the basis of Richard 
Cureton’s contribution, ‘Meter and Metrical Reading in Temporal Poetics’ (pp. 
112-237). Understood temporally, metre is a ‘beating, a structure of felt pulsations’ 
(p. 112), and is thus grasped in terms of cyclical, rather than linear time. But this 
also means that metre is understood as one of four rhythmic components of 
versification (along with grouping, prolongation, and theme); Cureton thus argues 
that we should narrow our conception of metre in order to attain greater 
conceptual clarity about what metre is and does. For instance, what a foot 
substitution metrist might consider a metrical syncopation, Cureton will argue is in 
fact the counterpoint between two different phrasings, or rhythmical organisations 
(for instance metre and grouping). His central question is how metre can affect our 
rhythmical reading of verse, and in the second half of the essay proposes a series 
of preference rules which will systematise the ways in which we read metrically.  
Cureton’s account of metre thus points towards another crucial ‘condition’ of 
poetry’s music—that of how we as readers perform as we read. This question is 
taken up most explicitly in the case studies Reuven Tsur (with Chen Gafni) puts 
forward in his ‘Poetry Reading—Rhythmical Performance’ (pp. 88-111). Like 
Cureton, Tsur argues against seeing rhythmical deviations from a metre as simply 
‘tension’; he goes on to suggest that we leave aside for a moment abstract rules and 
rather ‘dwell on what we hear’ (p. 89). In particular he wishes to ask whether, in 
performance, a reader of poetry might be able to hold in abeyance conflicting 
intonation contours, rather than having to plump for one or other interpretation. 
New digital technology allows us to ‘doctor’ the choices made in recorded 
readings; the case studies Tsur uses in the current essay are experiments with this 
technology in order to work out whether readings can be imagined in which 
conflicting prosodic patterns intersect in a single performance. 
There are, of course, many more conditions, and musics, than can be treated in 
the current volume: popular forms, from folk-song to dub poetry and hip-hop, for 
instance, or technological changes in both music-making and recording equipment 
over recent centuries. In Essai sur l’origine des langues, Rousseau directed his ire at 
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Rameau, who was himself taking advantage of the invention of the modern 
keyboard and the acoustic and technical possibilities that offered, whilst Wagner’s 
Gesamtkunstwerk would not have been possible without the acoustics of concert 
halls (and accessibility of anvils for orchestral use) in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century. Whilst the phrase ‘the condition of music’ arises from a 
particular moment in the histories of music, poetry and criticism, and this volume 
reflects such a bias to some degree, it is by no means the only conception of music 
that has influenced poets and critics—one might think, for instance, of 
Pythagorean models in the seventeenth century, or the model, often associated 
with romanticism, of music as spontaneous subjective expression. Such is the 
breadth of the topic, that all the current volume can do is address some of these 
issues: not aspire to treat them exhaustively or definitively, but rather offer a series 
of paths for further thinking.  
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